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CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS AND STATE LEGISLATORS
Doyle W. Buckwalter*
I. INTRODUCTION
ECENT EFFORTS to amend the United States Constitution, i.e., ap-portionment, a rewriting of Article V, and legislation to implement
the amending clause, have directed considerable public attention to the
possibility of a constitutional convention. The recent spate of congres-
sional and academic discussions has revealed several basic issues in
this controversy, many of which have surprised public officials. With
the death of Senator Everett Dirksen in 1969 and the apparent in-
sufficient number of state petitions for a convention, the impetus for
an immediate convention has dramatically diminished. Yet, the fate of
congressional bills to operationalize the convention portion of Article
V remains indeterminate. Such legislation, in essence, would establish
explicit procedures for state and federal government involvement in
establishing constitutional conventions.1 There has been little attempt
to ascertain state legislative attitudes and to integrate additional data
on state legislative processes on the subject of constitutional conventions.
Consequently, this paper shall (1) consider a brief history of the
Article, and (2) discuss four basic questions of the convention con-
troversy and how these are perceived by state legislators throughout
the United States.
II. EARLY PRECEDENTS AND DEBATES
As the Constitutional Convention of 1787 convened to consider
basic plans for revising the Articles of Confederation, there were several
alternative approaches to the question of future alteration of the
Articles. It became clear that a major focal point of discussion would
be the inoperative amending process. Charles Pinckney, in his "Plan
for a Federal Constitution," urged on May 29, the following amendment
procedure:
If two-thirds of the Legislatures of the States apply for the same,
the Legislature of the United States shall call a convention for the
purpose of amending the Constitution; or, should Congress, with the
* B.A., MA., Brigham Young University; Ph.D., University of Michigan. Associate Pro-
fessor of Political Science, Brigham Young University.
1 S. 2307, 90th Cong. and S. 623, 91st Cong. were the principal procedural legislative mea-
sures introduced.
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consent of two-thirds of each House, propose to the States amendments
to the same, the agreement of two-thirds of the Legislatures of the
States shall be sufficient to make the said amendments parts of the
Constitution.2
Pinckney expressed deep concern that unless alteration of the unani-
mous consent clause of the Articles was imminent, the nation would
inevitably continue in its "depressed situation."'
The Virginia Plan, suggested by Edmund Randolph, contained in
its Resolution XIII the reference to amendments:
. . . provision ought to be made for the amendment of the Articles of
Union whensoever it shall seem necessary; and that the assent of the
National Legislature ought not to be required thereto.4
Charles Pinckney "doubted the propriety or necessity for the last
clause," but Elbridge Gerry claimed that "the prospect of such a re-
vision would also give intermediate stability to the Government." 5 It
was Madison who strongly advocated not requiring the assent of the
national government. He asserted it was:
. . . better to provide for them in an easy, regular and constitutional
way, than to trust to chance and violence. It would be improper to
require the consent of the National Legislature, because they may abuse
their power, and refuse their assent on that very account. The oppor-
tunity for such an abuse, may be the fault of the Constitution calling
for amendment.6
There was unanimous acceptance of Randolph's proposal with the excep-
tion of the last clause.
Subsequently, Alexander Hamilton presented his plan which called
for adoption of the following amendment procedure:
This constitution may receive such alterations and amendments as
may be proposed by the Legislature of the United States, with the con-
currence of two-thirds of the members of both Houses, and ratified by
the Legislature of, or by Conventions of deputies chosen by the people
in two-thirds of the States composing the Union.7
From July 26 to August 6, the Detail Committee considered the
amending provision and subsequently reported the following:
On the application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the States
2 James Madison, Journal of the Federal Convention 72 (Scott ed. 1898).
s I. Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 120 (1911).
4 Supra n.2 at 63.
5 Id. at 110.
I Id. at 149.
7 Supra n.3 at 693.
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in the Union, for an amendment of this Constitution, the Legislature
of the United States shall call a convention for the purpose.8
On September 10, Elbridge Gerry urged reconsideration of the amend-
ing provision as he vehemently objected to the two-thirds requirement
because it might subvert the Union. The reconsideration motion, though
not unanimous, was given support from Madison. He prophetically de-
clared: "there [is] extreme vagueness of the terms, 'calling a conven-
tion' .... ." He further inquired, "How was a convention to be formed,
by what rule decided-what is the force of its acts?" 10 Wilson's labori-
ous attempt to retain the provision "of three-fourths of the states" was
successful. Madison eventually proposed a slightly modified version
which appeared most palatable. It read:
The Legislature of the U.S. whenever two thirds of both Houses
shall deem necessary, or on the application of two thirds of the legis-
latures of the several States, shall propose amendments to this Consti-
tution, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as parts thereof,
when the same shall have been ratified by three fourths at least of the
Legislatures of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths
thereof, as one or the other mode of ratification be proposed by the
Legislature of the U.S.11
Only two short amendments were added to Madison's proposal-no
amendments affecting specific items in Article I before 1808, and the
right of state suffrage in the Senate.'
Randolph and Gerry, among others, refused to sign the Constitu-
tion on grounds that the role of the Congress was objectionable and,
moreover, that frequent changes were extremely undesirable. Con-
versely, Patrick Henry accused the framers of the Constitution with at-
tempting to make it virtually impossible for amending because the
three-fourths ratification process was inordinately demanding. Madison
summarized the thoughts of those supporting the amending procedures:
That use alterations will be suggested by experience, could not but
be foreseen. It was requisite, therefore, that a mode for introducing
them should be provided. The mode preferred by the convention seems
to be stamped with every mark of propriety. It guards equally against
that extreme facility, which would render the Constitution too mu-
table; and that extreme difficulty, which might perpetuate its discov-
ered faults. It, moreover, equally enables the general and the state
8 1. Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 159 (1911).
9 Supra n.2 at 693.
10 Id.
11 Supra n.3 at 126-127.
12 See James Madison, The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 which Framed The
Constitution of The United States 573 (Hunt and Scott ed. 1929).
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governments to originate the amendment of errors, and they may be
pointed out by the experience on one side, or on the other. 13
Ratification by the states did involve numerous deliberate discussions of
the amending clause, yet the arguments were repetitious of those at the
Convention. Since that time, states have utilized Article V many times in
requesting a congressional call for a constitutional convention.
Between 1789 and 1889, only ten petitions for a constitutional con-
vention were registered with Congress. New York and Virginia sub-
mitted petitions, simultaneously with their constitutional ratifications. 4
Congress rendered the convention process unnecessary, in these par-
ticular cases, by opting for the first amendment procedure. In 1833,
South Carolina, Alabama and Georgia memorialized Congress to call a
convention. South Carolina petitioned to secure a clarification of federal
and state powers, while Georgia desired a thorough consideration of the
personal freedoms of Indians. Alabama sought a convention to sum-
marily consider all amendment proposals presently before Congress."
Prior to the outbreak of the Civil War, Kentucky, Indiana, Virginia,
Illinois, and Ohio petitioned for a constitutional convention in a des-
perate attempt to prevent the dissolution of the nation. The convention,
in the latter case, would have been officially assigned the responsibility
of preparing an authoritative interpretation of the constitution.
Subsequent to 1893, the utilization of the application process was
much more prevalent. Commencing with Nebraska, some thirty-one
states petitioned Congress concerning the direct election of Senators.
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, Americans have witnessed
a significant variety of suggested convention topics (See Table I).
III. CURRENT ACTION AND ATTITUDES
ON CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS
As of January, 1970, 32 states had petitioned Congress to summon
a constitutional convention to consider the subject of state legislative
apportionment.16 Though this amount was two less than the requisite
13 The Federalist, No. 43 286-87 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937).
14 H.R. Jour., 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 32, 34 (1789).
15 S. Jour., 22d Cong., 2d Sess., 65-66, 83 (1833).
16 On July 8, 1969, the lower House in the Illinois State Legislature withdrew its support
of its original 1965 Joint Resolution. On August 13, 1969, the Oklahoma State Attorney ruled
its concurrent resolution petition as not binding, as the Governor's approval was refused. The
Utah resolution as declared null and void by U.S. Federal Court because of the malapportion-
ment issue. Consequently, the action in these three states leaves only 29 state petitions on file
with Congress.
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TABLE I
State applications to Congress for constitutional conventions, listed by sub-
ject matter.*
1. Direct election of senators
Ark. (1901, 1903, 1911) ; Calif. (1903,
1911) ; Colo. (1901) ; Ida. (1901,
1903) ; I1. (1903, 1907, 1909) ; Ind.
(1907) ; Iowa (1904, 1907, 1909);
Kans. (1901, 1905, 1907, 1909); Ky.
(1902); La. (1907); Me. (1911);
Mich. (1901); Minn. (1901, 1911);
Mo. (1901, 1903, 1905) ; Mont. (1901,
1903, 1905, 1907, 1908, 1911); Neb.
(1893, 1901, 1903, 1907); Nev. (1901,
1903, 1905, 1907, 1907); N.J. (1907);
N.C. (1901, 1907); N.D. (1903);
Ohio (1908, 1911); Okla. (1908);
Ore. (1901, 1901, 1903, 1903, 1907,
1909); Penn. (1901); S.D. (1901,
1907, 1909) ; Tenn. (1901, 1901, 1903,
1905); Tex. (1901, 1911); Utah
(1903); Wash. (1903); Wisc. (1903,
1907, 1908); Wyo. (1895)
2. Limitation of federal taxing power
Ala. (1943); Ark. (1943); Del.
(1943); Fla. (1951); Ga. (1952); Il.
(1943); Ind. (1943), 1957); Iowa
(1941, 1951); Kans. (1951); Ky.
(1944); La. (1950); Me. (1941,
1951); Mass. (1941); Mich. (1941,
1949) ; Miss. (1940); Neb. (1949);
N.H. (1943, 1951); N.J. (1944);
N.M. (1951); Okla. (1955); Penn.
(1943); R.I. (1940); Utah (1951);
Va. (1952); Wisc. (1943); Wyo.
(1939)
3. Prohibition of polygamy
Calif. (1909); Conn. (1915); Del.
(1907); Ill. (1913); Iowa (1906);
La. (1916); Me. (1907); Md. (1908,
1914); Mich. (1913); Minn. (1909);
Mont. (1911); Neb. (1911); N.H.
(1911); N.Y. (1906); N.D. (1907);
Ohio (1911); Okla. (1911); Ore.
(1913); Penn. (1907, 1913); S.C.
(1915); S.D. (1909); Tenn. (1911);
Tex. (1911); Vt. (1912); Wash.
(1909, 1910); W. Va. (1907); Wis.
(1913)
4. General revision of the Constitution
Colo. (1901); Ga. (1832) ; Ill. (1861,
1903); Ind. (1861); La. (1907); Mo.
(1907) ; Mont. (1911) ; Neb. (1907) ;
Nev. (1907); N.Y. (1789); N.C.
(1907); Ohio (1861); Okla. (1908);
Ore. (1901); Tex. (1889); Va. (1788,
1861); Wash. (1901, 1903); Wis.
(1911, 1929); Iowa (1907, 1909);
Kans. (1901, 1905, 1907) ; Ky. (1861)
5. World federal government
Calif. (1949); Conn. (1949); Fla.
(1943, 1945,1949); Me. (1949); N.J.
(1949); N.C. (1949)
6. Repeal of 18th amendment
Mass. (1931); Nev. (1925); N.J.
(1932); N.Y. (1931); Wis. (1931)
7. Limitation of presidential tenure
Ill. (1943); Iowa (1943); Mich.
(1943); Mont. (1947); Wis. (1943).
8. Treaty making of president
Fla. (1945); Ga. (1952); Ind. (1957)
9. Taxation of federal and state se-
curities
Calif. (1935); Ida. (1927)
10. Against protective tariff
Ala. (1833)
11. Federal regulation of wages and
hours of labor
Calif. (1952)
12. Federal tax on gasoline
Calif. (1952)
13. Tidelands control
Tex. (1949)
14. Control of trusts
Ill. (1911)
15. Prohibition of grants-in aid
Penn. (1943)
* This is an updated version of Cyril F. Brickfield, Problems Relating to A Federal Consti-
tutional Convention, House Committee on the Judiciary, 85th CoNG., 1st SEss., (1957), 89-91.
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TABLE I (Continued)
16. Popular ratification of amend-
ments
La. (1920)
17. Constitutionality of state enact-
ments
Mo. (1913)
18. Townsend Plan
Ore. (1939)
19. Revision of Article V
Ark. (1963) ; Fla. (1963) ; Ida. (1957,
1963); Ill. (1953, 1963); Ind.
(1957); Kans. (1963**); Mich.
(1956) ; Mo. (1963); Okla. (1963) ;
S.C. (1963) ; S.D. (1953, 1963, 1955);
Tex. (1955, 1963); Wyo. (1963); Va.
(1965)
20. Reapportionment
Ark. (1963); Ind. (1957); Ida.
(1963); Kans. (1963); Mo. (1963) ;
Mont. (1963); Nev. (1963); S.C.
(1963); Tex. (1963); Wash. (1963);
Wyo. (1963); Va. (1964); Ala.
(1965); Ariz. (1965); Ark. (1965);
Colo. (1965); Fla. (1965); Ga.
(1965); Ida. (1965) ; Ill. (1965***);
Kans. (1965****); Ky. (1965); La.
(1965); Md. (1965); Minn. (1965);
Miss. (1965); Mo. (1965); Mont.
(1965); Neb. (1965); N.H. (1965);
N.C. (1965); N.D. (1965); Okla.
(1965-****); S.C. (1965), S.D.
(1965); Tex. (1965); Va. (1965);
Utah (1965"*****); Ala. (1966) ;
N.M. (1966); Tenn. (1966); Colo.
(1967); IlL (1967); Ind. (1967);
Nev. (1967); N.D. (1967); Iowa
(1969)
21. Balancing the budget
Ind. (1957; Wyo. (1961)
22. State control of schools
Ga. (1955, 1959, 1965); La. (1965);
Miss. (1965)
23. Examination of the 4th amendment
ratification
Ark. (1959)
24. Repeal of 16th amendment
Nev. (1960); S.C. (1962)
25. Establish a Court of the Union
Ala. (1963); Ark. (1963); Fla.
(1963); S.C. (1963); Wyo. (1963)
26. Presidential elections
Ark. (1963); Colo. (1963); Mont.
(1963); S.D. (1963); Tex. (1963);
Utah (1963); Wis. (1963); Kans.
(1963-******); Okla. (1965); Ill.
(1967); Neb. (1965)
27. Limiting and retiring the national
debt
Ida. (1963)
28. Pay pensions to certain people
Mass. (1964)
29. Reading the Bible in schools
Mass. (1964)
30. Prayer in schools
Mass. (1964)
31. Sharing income tax (revenue shar-
ing)
Illinois (1965); Ohio (1965); Ala.
(1967); Tex. (1967); Fla. (1969);
N.H. (1969)
32. Control of the Communist Party
in the United States
Miss. (1965)
33. Taxation
Colo. (1963)
34. Prohibit race segregation in public
schools
Miss. (1970)
** Rescinded in 1970.
*** House rescinded in 1969.
**** Rescinded in 1970.
**** * Declared null and void by state attorney general because no executive signature.
* *** * * Declared null and void by federal district court, 1969.
* ****** Rescinded in 1970.
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number, the possibility of such an occurrence presented, for some peo-
ple, an unpredictable and tremendous onslaught on the constitutional
foundation of this nation. Because Article V stipulates state petitions
and involvement, it would seem desirable to have a survey of the state
legislators' views surrounding the possibility of a constitutional con-
vention. A survey of the 1969-70 state legislatures and processes re-
vealed some interesting information on four basic questions regarding
the constitutional convention.* A brief examination of each question
will be followed by survey results.
Must the Language of Amendments Proposed
in State Petitions be Identical?
Readily noticeable in the apportionment case are three major cate-
gories of apportionment petitions-(1) abolishing of federal judicial
review of state legislative apportionment, (2) requesting a convention
to reverse the decision of Reynolds v. Sims,'" and (3) establishing cri-
teria other than mere population for apportionment determination. Con-
stitutional writers would fundamentally disagree whether the amount
of similarity is sufficient. Lester B. Orfield claimed that the "ground of
the application would be immaterial, and that a demand by two-thirds
of the states would conclusively show a widespread desire for constitu-
tional changes."' 7 The House Committee on the Judiciary of 1952 ques-
tioned the wisdom and practicality of identicalness:
Conversely, there appears no valid reason to suppose that the lan-
guage of the amendments requested in State applications must be
identical with one another in wording. It should be enough that the
suggested amendments be of the same general subject matter in order
to be included in a congressional count of applications for a constitu-
tional convention, bearing in mind, of course, that any or all of the
states may at any time request a general convention should strong
sentiment for such proceedings prevai.18
Contrariwise, Charles L. Black urged the necessity for exact form
because it "is illegitimate to infer, from a state's having asked for a
* Twenty-one percent (1589) of the 7,568 legislators responded to the questionnaire. Conse-
quently, the reported results are not technically randomized nor conclusive and should only be
considered reflective in nature.
la 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
17 L Orfield, The Amending of the Federal Constitution 42 (1942).
18 House Committee on the Judiciary, Problems Relating to State Applications for a Con-
vention to Propose Constitutional Limitations on Federal Tax Rates, 82nd Cong., 2d Sess., 11-12
(1952).
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'convention' to vote a textually.given amendment up or down, that it
desires some other sort of convention. It is not for Congress to guess
whether a state which asks for the one kind of 'convention' wants the
other as a second choice. Altogether different political considerations
might govern."'"
The state legislative survey revealed that slightly over 57 percent
of the 1,589 respondents considered identical language as not requisite
for calling a constitutional convention. Justifications for this position
included "political considerations," "substantive natures of topics
rather than procedural," "experience," and "state individuality." Many
legislators maintained that a clearinghouse operation might insure
similarity in state petitions, but unforeseen problems could result from
the uniformity in legislative devices utilized for petitioning Congress.
The legislative measures utilized by the states differ widely and lead to
considerable difficulty in determining the exact intent and legality of the
legislative action. Three principal methods are generally employed in
the states: joint resolution, concurrent resolution, and memorials.
Norman J. Small, Legislative Attorney, American Law Division of the
Congressional Legislative Reference Service, indicated the difference
between memorials and petitions:
The former are merely exhortations to the Congress to exercise its
power to originate, approve, and submit for ratification a specific
proposal as an amendment to the Constitution. As an exhortation, such
memorials are deemed to give rise to no more than a moral obligation
on the part of Congress to respond affirmatively thereto when tendered
by a substantial number or even by as many as two-thirds, of the
States. 20
Small equates "petitions" with "applications," but does admit that
even the "petitions" (resolutions, etc.) may be legally questionable be-
cause they have not been tested in the courts. Some of the states require
51 percent majority, while others demand no less than 65 percent ap-
proval. Table II indicates the various devices utilized by the state leg-
islatures as determined by our survey. There is state consensus that
combined action of both legislature houses is necessarily required. This
assumption is substantiated by a staff Study of the House Committee on
19 C. Black, The Proposed Amendment of Article V: A Threatened Disaster, 72
Yale L.J. 963-964 (1963).
20 N. Small, Procedures for Amending the United States Constitution, Library of
Congress Legislative Reference Service 1965.
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the Judiciary in 1952, which contended that identical but separate res-
olutions would not constitute a legislative measure.2'
As Table II indicates, the governor's approval of petitions is re-
quired in at least fourteen states, depending on whether the states utilize
Joint or Concurrent Resolutions. Article V indicates that the "legisla-
ture" constitutes the petitioning body, yet this fails to delineate whether
this has reference to the legislative process, or the specific representative
lawmaking body. According to the U.S. Supreme Court, the connotation
of the "legislature" depends upon the particular function engaged in.22
For example, we note that in Article I, Section IV of the Constitution,
the state electoral process has explicit reference to the total lawmaking
process, i.e., legislative and executive. In 1920, the Supreme Court
ruled in Hawke v. Smith" that because "ratification by a State of a con-
stitutional amendment is not an act of legislation within the proper sense
of the word," the Governor would not be directly involved. With re-
gards to convention petitions, the state legislature would not be func-
tioning in a routine legislative capacity, but as an agent in the national
government responsibility. However, in 1969, the Oklahoma Attorney
General explicitly contradicted this view:
.. . the resolution . . . was not signed by the Governor, it did not be-
come the law of this state. . . . It is the opinion of the Attorney Gen-
eral that a concurrent resolution passed by a session of the Oklahoma
Legislature which does not meet the criteria of becoming law, is merely
an expression of opinion of that particular body and has no binding
effect on a subsequent session of the Legislature. 24
How Long Should a State Petition Requesting a
Constitutional Convention Remain Valid?
Article V is silent on this perplexing subject, though many would
agree with the Supreme Court on the constitutional ratification pro-
cedures and attempt to utilize this as an analogy comparable to the
state legislative petition process.
[A]s ratification is but the expression of the approbation of the people
and is to be effective when had in three-fourths of the States, there
is a fair implication that it must be sufficiently contemporaneous in
21 Staff of House Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., Problems Relating to State
Applications for a Convention to Propose Constitutional Limitations of Federal Tax Rates
(Comm. Print 1950).
22 Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932).
23 253 U.S. 221, 229 (1920).
24 115 Cong. Rec. 9992-93 (daily ed. Aug. 13, 1969).
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TABLE II
Device for Constitutional Conventions
Governor's
State Bill J. Resol. Con. Resol. Memorial Approval
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
XX
X
X
X
X
X
X
x
x
XX
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X can rescind
X X
X can rescind
X
X
X
X
yes
yes, not to veto
yes
no, yes
no
X Joint yes, not adhered
no
yes
X may rescind no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
yes
no
no
yes
no
no
no
X no
no
no
yes, no
X Joint no
no
X
X
no
no
X Joint no
no, no
yes, yes
no
X
yes
yes
no, yes
X no
no
X Joint no
no
no
X yes
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that number of States to reflect the will of the people in all sections
at relatively the same period which of course ratification scattered
through a long series of years would not do. . . . the fair inference
or implication from Article V is that the ratification must be within
some reasonable time after proposal.25
The term "sufficiently contemporaneous" becomes the pivotal criterion
on which the controversy rests. Arthur Bonfield indicates that rather
than relying on such criteria as changing social, economic, and political
events, the fundamental criterion should the legislative period in which
all states have had the opportunity to meet in one full regular session.26
This approach appears to have a distinct advantage because it challenges
those recommending a convention on a particular subject to provide con-
vincing evidence from other current legislatures on the consensus of
calling a convention. In theory, then, the duration factor of two years
would represent a current poll of legislators' attitudes. The data from
our legislative survey, particularly of the 32 states which urged a con-
stitutional convention on reapportionment, gives some insight on the
problems of "sufficiently contemporaneous." In 1963, petitions from
the following states were received: Arkansas, Idaho, Kansas, Missouri,
Montana, Nevada, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Washington,
and Wyoming. The following year, Virginia requested the Congress to
call a convention. The 1965-66 legislative period witnessed a flurry of
petitions: Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Utah." The 90th
Congress in 1967 received similar petitions from Illinois, Indiana,
North Dakota, and Colorado.2" Senate Bill 2307 of the 90th Congress
called for a six-year petition duration, though some congressmen and
committee witnesses urged periods from two to seven years. It became
conspicuously clear that unless the six-year prerequisite was adopted,
the eleven petitions of 1963 would be declared void by the end of 1969.
Senator Dirksen's determined efforts to gather sufficient consensus on
initiating floor consideration were cut short by his illness and eventual
death in September, 1969. Had Dirksen been successful in securing
25 Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 375 (1921).
26 A. Bonfield, Proposing Constitutional Amendments by Convention: Some Prob-
lems, 39 Notre Dame L. 659 (1964).
27 The Legislative Reference Service reported that there is no record of the petition S.R.
14 submitted by Georgia. The petitions from New Hampshire and Utah, though appearing in the
Congressional Record, were not forwarded to the Judiciary Committees in the House or Senate.
28 Colorado maintains that S.J. Memorial No. 5 was forwarded to Congress, though no
record can be found.
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favorable Congressional action, the implications may have been rather
astounding. For example, our survey found the total number of leg-
islators voting on the petitions, in states where it was accepted, amounted
to 5,259. Nevertheless, in 1969 when Congress may have rendered a
decision allowing a constitutional convention, 57 percent of those orig-
inal legislators voting on the petitions were no longer in the state leg-
islatures. This significant change in personnel makes the issue of "suf-
ficiently contemporaneous" even more poignant. A discussion of the
partisanship of the state legislatures makes the change of personnel
more complicated. Assuming that an issue might be purely partisan,
would the petition remain consistently representative of the current
legislative attitude? Between 1963 and 1969, we observed that sub-
sequent to the petition acceptance, there were 13 party control turn-
overs, 2 ties, and 8 nonpartisan elections. There is substantial evidence
that petitions, purely partisan in nature, might be rejected and not re-
flect the contemporary attitude.
The legislative survey disclosed conflicting data as well as con-
structive suggestions for alleviating the entire question of petition dura-
tion. Nearly 80 percent of the respondents recommend a four-year
duration period or the completion of the second session. This procedure
would allow a double check on whether the legislature, in the first in-
stance, acted presumptuously. Congress would be responsible for trans-
mitting copies of the petition to all states and requesting immediate
consideration. Simultaneously, as state legislators supported this con-
clusion, 85 percent favored retaining state control of the petition by
power of recission. There was substantial fear that a specific legislative
body might act contrary to the public good, necessitating a reconsidera-
tion of the petition. Yet, if the four-year duration factor existed, then
the recission power would be valid for only one attempt.
May Congress Refuse to Call a Constitutional Convention?
Edmund Randolph introduced the original resolution providing
for constitutional revision:
[Resolved] that provision ought to be made for the amendment
of the Articles of Union whensoever it shall seem necessary, and
that the assent of the National Legislature ought not to be required
thereto.29
29 1. Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention 11 (1911).
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Colonel Mason contended that "it would be improper to require the
consent of the National Legislature, because they may abuse their power,
and refuse their consent on that very account.""0 Up until the last two
weeks of the convention, the primary discussion concerned the sole re-
sponsibility of the state legislatures to propose amendments. Governor
Morris and Mr. Gerry moved to amend the article to have a mandatory
convention when the requisite number of states had requested. Madison
strongly supported the view of mandatory congressional action."' One
week before the convention concluded, Hamilton and Gerry successfully
urged reconsideration of the amendment article because of the failure
to include congressional prerogative to propose amendments. Con-
sequently, Madison's proposal to allow both Congress and the state
legislatures to make proposals was adopted. Yet, on the last day of the
convention, a compromise was enacted which allowed for both con-
gressional and state proposals, but stipulated a convention process for
the latter.
Undoubtedly the most compelling evidence of congressional ob-
ligation to summon a convention came to light immediately after the
constitutional convention. In the Federalist Papers, No. 85, Hamilton
claimed that:
By the fifth article of the plan, the Congress will be obligated "on
application of the legislatures of two thirds of the states . . . to call a
Convention for proposing amendments. . ." The words of this article
are preemptory. The Congress shall call a Convention. Nothing in this
particular is left to the discretion of that body.3 2
At the initial Congress, Madison implored his colleagues to con-
sider the subject of amendments, specifically, the amendments which
would contain the Bill of Rights.3 The following day, May 5, 1789, a
member of Congress displayed a state legislative petition for a conven-
tion. Madison claimed that thorough discussion of the petition would be
inappropriate until the requisite number of petitions had been received
and ". . . then it is out of the power of Congress to decline complying,
the words of the Constitution being express and positive relative to the
agency Congress may have in case of applications of this nature .. ,
30 Id. at 203.
31 Id. at 629-30.
32 The Federalist, No. 85 586 (Wright ed. 1961).
33 1. Annals 247. See also an excellent discussion of this amendment process, Forkosch,
Who are the People in the Preamble to the Constitution? 6 W. Res. L. Rev. (1967).
34 I. Annals 249. Five months earlier, a letter from Madison indicated that 'if two-thirds
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS AND STATE LEGISLATORS
Consequently, the petition was placed in the archives until others would
arrive.
Regardless of whether one concurs with the foregoing, a funda-
mental question remains: What recourse do the states have in the event
Congress fails to act? Some argue that Congress performs in a min-
isterial role in calling for a convention; thus the Supreme Court would
have authority to issue some form of mandamus requiring the legisla-
tive body to act.35 Unless Congress could be forced to comply, the intent
of the framers would be thwarted. Cyril F. Brickfield and Arthur E.
Bonfield claim, on the contrary, that the courts would not enter the
controversy because of the "doctrine of the separation of powers" which
prohibits injurious intrusion of one branch on another.36 The concept of
"coordinate branch respect" was not violated by the Baker v. Carr36  nor
the Westberry v. Sanders"6b cases. For example, Bonfield asserts that,
[J]udicial review on the merits of legislative apportionment or the
drawing of congressional districts by the states only involves federaljudicial superintendence of state action or inaction; but judicial re-
view of Congress' failure to call an Article V convention directly in-
volves the federal courts in an effort to force its co-equal branch of the
Government to perform a duty exclusively entrusted to it by the Con-
stitution."'37
How do current legislators react to the power of Congress to call a
national constitutional convention? Seventy-four percent of the 1589
respondents favored the mandatory clause requiring Congress to initiate
a convention call. The basic rationale suggested was the prohibiting of
Congress from becoming completely dominant in the amending process.
Allowing Congress to debate the need as indicated by the petitions would
unnecessarily complicate the task of retaining the sufficient number of
petitions. The "contemporaneousness" of the petitions would be brought
into question. A typical legislator response was, "the 'shall' in Article
of the States apply for one, Congress cannot refuse to call it .... ." V Documentary History of
the Constitution 141.
35 W. K. Tuller, A Convention to Amend the Constitution, 193 N. Am. Rev. 379-81
(1911); E. Cuvillier, Shall We Revise the Constitution? 77 Forum 323-25 (1927) ; F. E.
Packard, Legal Facets of the Income Tax Rate Limitation Program. 30 Chi.-Kent L. Rev.
128 (1952); F. E. Packard, Constitutional Law: The States and the Amending Process 45
A.B.AJ. 161 (1959).
36 Cyril F. Brickfield, House Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., Problems
Relating to A Federal Constitutional Convention 27 (1957) ; supra n.26 at 672-73.
36a 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
36b 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
37 Supra n.26 at 673.
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V stipulates precisely that-Congress must act, and unless it does, the
states are relegated to complete subservience in the amending process."
Can State Legislative Petitions Control the Subject Matter
Considered by the Constitutional Convention?
Basically, the question is whether the convention ought to be viewed
as a premier assembly of the people possessing "conventional Sover-
eignty," or whether the states can stipulate the subject area or areas of
discussion. Article V permits the following: "The Congress, whenever
two thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amend-
ments to this constitution, or, on the application of the legislatures of
two thirds of the several states, shall call a convention for proposing
amendments. . . ."' Professor Charles Black maintains that:
The process of 'proposal' by Congress contained in the first al-
ternative of Article Five, obviously (and necessarily) includes the
process of plenary deliberation upon the whole problem to which the
amendment is to address itself. It entails choice among the whole range
of alternatives as to substance and wording. It is 'proposal' in the most
fully substantial sense, where the proposer controls and works out the
content and form of the proposition. It is very doubtful whether the
same word two lines later, in the description of the second alternative,
ought to be taken to denote a mechanical take-it or leave-it process."
Arthur E. Bonfield supports this position by claiming that the constitu-
tional convention would necessarily have the ability to propose amend-
ments as solutions to the basic subject area. He categorically rejects the
recent resolutions suggested by the Council of State Governments and
adopted by several states because:
.. the resolutions in issue [resolutions calling Congress to establish a
convention for specific reasons] really call for a convention empow-
ered solely to approve or disapprove in a mechanical way the text of
specific amendments that have already been 'proposed' elsewhere. In
this sense, the proponents of these resolutions seek to make the "Con-
vention" part of the ratifying process, rather than part of the delibera-
tive process for "proposing" constitutional amendment. 40
Allowing the convention to select the most acceptable format of amend-
ment to be voted on by the legislatures or conventions in the various
states would give the constitutional convention a propitious opportunity
to conduct deliberations on the proposal.
38 U.S. Const. art. V.
39 Supra n.19 at 962.
40 Supra n.26 at 662-63.
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Our survey data appeared to support contrary positions. A sub-
stantial 77 percent claimed the state applications would control the
particular subjects discussed at the convention. Congress would only
summon the convention for a particular time and location and would
make but one limitation on the convention-a perfunctory statement of
what subject the state legislators wanted considered. A total of 1,334
legislators (84 percent) supported the single amendment convention,
which suggests they view the convention as a ratifying rather than a
deliberative body. There was a general fear expressed (83 percent) that
a premier assembly, possessing inherent power to determine subjects
of discussion and the power to recommend amendments, would prove
detrimental to the constitutional framework. One might assume, as a
result of the variety of convention subjects recommended in the survey,
that the legislators would prefer having issue clarification before sub-
mitting them to a constitutional convention.
IV. PRESENT DEMANDS FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
Legislators in the 1969-70 survey had neither reached a general
consensus on the need for a convention, nor the topics which might be
considered. In addition to the 557 requests for an immediate constitu-
tional convention on apportionment, there were additional 499 requests
for other issue considerations. The following limited list gives some in-
dication of subjects which were specifically recommended by our re-
spondents.
TABLE III
Subjects for State Petitions
1. State rights 14. 5th amendment
2. Changing electoral college 15. Voting age
3. Busing students 16. Curbing the Supreme Court powers
4. National debt 17. Military spending
5. Eavesdropping 18. Welfare
6. Income tax limit 19. Law and order
7. Outlawing communists 20. Educational and local control
8. Judicial reform 21. Presidential powers
9. Bill of Rights 22. Item veto for president
10. Judges retirement 23. Rights of white race
11. Prayer in school 24. Federal grants
12. Right to bear arms 25. Executive department power
13. Apportionment 26. General constitutional review
Though the foregoing list is inconclusive and represents a minute pro-
portion of potential state legislative respondents, the data does render an
indication of potential convention subjects.
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It is not inconceivable that such topics as "electoral college re-
vision" might evoke sufficient support that the nation would be con-
fronted with chaotic imbroglio. One state legislator, with 15 years
experience, expressed the following sentiment regarding the ease with
which the requisite number of petitions might be secured:
It is possible that with pressure from such groups as the Council
of State Governments, plus a well planned drive to have each state
introduce and consider a particular petition, that within four years
there would be more than ample requests for a convention.
Though there may be sufficient number of legislators who advocate
numerous changes, the intensity and intention of those supporters may
be questioned. One legislator, reflecting the apparent fear of an open
constitutional convention, made this statement:
I have talked with many of my colleagues who were also fright-
ened that a convention may completely undo the fundamental prin-
ciples of our constitution. Many of them voted to have Congress call a
convention, not because they wanted one necessarily, but because they
wanted Congress to know how the legislators felt. From now on we
will not petition for a convention, but simply urge the Congress to
propose an amendment about a specific subject. This way, we know
that there will be only one amendment, which we here in the states can
accept or reject.
This statement does have some empirical support. Nearly three
fourths of all petitions seek constitutional revision, but not for the con-
vention process.
Our survey responses reveal a wide range of attitudes, many of
them expressing distrust of the convention, while others anticipate some
significant results from the convening of a national constitutional
convention:
I think that each state should take two consecutive sessions and
consider major areas and then transmit their actions to the Congress.
I believe that we need to have a public referendum, requiring at
least 2/3 of those voting in the last election, before the state legislature
considers the possibility of adopting a constitutional petition.
I see no real threat in conducting a constitutional convention, be-
cause all of its proposals have to be accepted by the States.
My colleagues, representing one of the largest states, feel that
there ought to be a continuous constitutional convention. Each section
of the constitution would receive a thorough hearing throughout the
country during one year's time, after which any new amendment propo-
sals would be voted on in convention and dispatched to the State
legislatures for their consideration.
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It would be possible for the Congress to actually solve many of
the problem areas which are bothering the state legislatures. A conven-
tion might open Pandora's box.
Many people have argued that the convention process of amending
the constitution is an anomaly in the law. Nevertheless, state legisla-
tures continue to petition Congress for the establishment of conventions.
Pertinent legislation has been explored in the Senate, yet no decision
has been concluded. The Ninety-Second Congress recently adopted its
latest proposed amendment: the 18 year old vote. Fifteen state legisla-
tures had resolutions pending which would call for a constitutional con-
vention on that subject. With the pre-emptive action by Congress, the
unused originating source of the state legislature remains to be tested.
Our data appears to support the retention of the convention process, and
yet a clarification of the convention procedure is imperative.
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